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ABSTRACT
This article presents a philosophical tour encircling the concept construct validity. Encapsulated 
by two major perspectives, realism and antirealism, we visit key topics within the philosophy of 
educational science such as representation and reference, truth, explanation and causation. We 
discuss how realism and antirealism deal with unobservables through the distinction between 
appearance and reality. We examine the two perspectives’ stance on observational terms (O-terms) 
and theoretical terms (T-terms), and look at the consequences implied for researchers that reside 
within the two perspectives. We argue that the understanding of the concept of construct validity 
is essential for educational researchers and researchers from any scientific discipline. Furthermore, 
the discussions of construct validity raised here is important beyond the research realm, such as 
in educational practice and in all everyday inferences people make about theoretical entities. Any 
researcher and practitioner is free to choose between the -isms, but must be aware that the choice 
has consequences. 
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Introduction 
Suppose you grade an exam and make the judgment that the student’s understand-
ing of the basic concepts of socio-cultural learning theory is confused and leaves 
much to be desired. Or, you test a student and make the judgment that her linguistic 
capacity is excellent. Just how trustworthy are your judgments? Suppose you observe 
a student’s (bad) study habits and explain them due to low motivation; or you watch 
a change in student achievement over time and explain it with learning taking place. 
Just how credible are your explanations?
The question concerning trustworthiness and credibility arises because the 
judgments and explanations in question make references to unobservable entities, 
attributes or processes such as understanding, ability, motivation or learning. How 
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justified are we in such judgments and explanations? In everyday life, we handle 
such unobservables with ease and generally with a high degree of confidence, even 
if we occasionally get things wrong. But in research? In research we have to pay 
close attention to the relation between our judgments about unobservables and the 
grounds on which we base these judgments – usually rooted in something observ-
able. We should be equally attentive in educational practice, where much can be at 
stake for the people we make our judgments about. This is where construct validity 
enters the picture. 
In this paper, we begin in medias res and look at construct validity, what it is and 
why it is important. This seemingly innocuous point of departure contains some of 
the biggest issues in science and philosophy: reference, truth, causation, explanation – 
what we think science is and what it can do for us. Starting from construct validity, we 
shall embark on a philosophical tour visiting these issues as they arise. Ultimately, we 
shall argue, both researchers and professional practitioners have some tough personal 
choices to make here. 
But first a little more stage-setting. Samuel Messick (1995) argues that construct 
validity applies to “all assessments, whether based on tests, questionnaires, behav-
ioral observations, work samples, or whatever” (p. 5). Basically, he says, validity 
is an evaluative judgment of the degree to which our empirical evidence supports 
the appropriateness of interpretation of test scores and their subsequent use. In less 
technical terms: we validate our constructs to justify the inferences we make about 
unobservable entities, processes and attributes of people. Am I right to attribute 
low motivation to this student, based on my observations of his behavior? What 
happens if my assumption is wrong, but I act toward the student as if it were true? 
While Messick’s discussion of construct validity is highly sophisticated, he does not 
touch on the adjacent philosophical issues. That seems to be left to philosophers of 
science. Conversely, philosophers of science do not write about construct validity; 
that seems to be left to methodologists or measurement specialists. Nor do philo-
sophers of education mention construct validity when they philosophize about edu-
cational research. David Bridges (2003), for example, who has written insightfully 
about educational research, largely focuses on epistemological and ethical assump-
tions. Richard Pring (2015) surveys different research methods, outlines compet-
ing philosophical positions (such as positivism, interpretivism and postmodernism) 
and discusses action research and practitioner research, yet nowhere does he touch 
on the issue of construct validity. Pring’s book does include a chapter where he 
addresses such key issues as realism, objectivity, causation, truth, facts, explanation, 
etc. Each concept receives a short treatment, one by one, but are not made to fit 
into a bigger picture or aligned under a major perspective. This is what we aim for in 
this paper: to employ construct validity to illuminate adjacent philosophical issues 
and make an effort to discover what is at stake, and in the process demonstrate the 
importance of paying close attention to our own inferential practices, in research 
and in practice.
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Unobservables
Our philosophical tour begins in the fact that construct validity crucially involves 
unobservables. Lurking in the background here we find the old distinction between 
appearance and reality. We have the appearance of things, e.g. student behavior, and 
we have the unobservable, inner entities, properties or mechanisms that we might 
presume responsibility for what we observe, e.g. motivation, understanding, person-
ality, intention, intelligence, learning, self-formation, and so on. Construct validity 
plunges us straight into deep metaphysical issues concerning the reality of abstract, 
unobservable entities. Should we believe what educational research tells us about 
reality beyond the appearance of things? Is it really the case that we can use motiva-
tion to explain behavior? Should we act on our everyday inferences to such unobserv-
ables, and thus take measures to increase student motivation? Do people really have 
the attributes that they appear to have? This is a longstanding philosophical problem: 
can we in principle distinguish between properties that truly belong to the person or 
object and properties that they do not really possess but exist only in the mind of the 
observer (Ladyman, 2002)? 
Terms that we use to talk about unobservables are generally called theoretical 
terms, or T-terms for short. All disciplines make claims about invisible, unobservable, 
undetectable, theoretical entities, events, states of affairs, properties, processes and 
qualities. This even holds for everyday and professional talk. So what are these unob-
servables? How can we know anything about them if we cannot see them? How can 
I know that a student has low motivation if my claim is justified only by my observa-
tions? In other words, what do T-terms refer to, if anything at all? 
Realism and antirealism
To investigate the question about what T-terms refer to, we go to the philosophy 
of science. Arguments over the ontological status of T-terms have developed into 
two different conceptions of science, commonly known as realism and antirealism 
(Kvernbekk, 2002, 2005). These conceptions represent the next stop on our philo-
sophical tour. Both realism and antirealism are subtle perspectives encompassing 
slightly differing versions, but for the sake of clarity of exposition we shall present a 
standard picture of each of them. 
We begin with the antirealists. The best-known antirealists are the logical posi-
tivists (but not all antirealists are positivists). James Ladyman (2002) describes the 
main tenets as follows, “They are empiricist in that they regard observation (expe-
rience) as the only source of knowledge; they are anti-theoretical entities; they are 
anti-causation, they emphasize verification and they downplay explanation” (p. 148). 
Central to their views is the empiricist criterion of meaning – a criterion that has been 
formulated in different ways over the years, but which basically says that if a term is 
to be meaningful, it must be connected to observation or experience. Science would 
do well to rid itself of pseudo-scientific terms and theories, such as “essence”, “thing 
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in itself” or “superego” and their related theories. According to the logical positivists, 
such terms are not related to anything that can be observed, and theories using these 
terms really do not claim anything at all. Unless a claim is empirically verifiable, it 
is not meaningful. The meaning of a claim is identical to its method of verification; 
that is, the way we show it to be true by experience. That is to say, scientific theories 
are to be tested empirically, by observation – a viewpoint that is an ingrained part of 
scientific lore today. At this point we make a short detour to Alfred Ayer, a British 
logical positivist. Retrospectively reviewing some of the main tenets of logical posi-
tivism, he explains that the assumption behind the principle of verification was that 
everything that could meaningfully be said could be expressed in terms of elemen-
tary statements (Ayer, 1959). Such statements were by some positivists taken to be 
a record of the subject’s immediate experiences: “claims about the world had to be 
verified by somebody’s experience” (p. 13). Ayer acknowledges that this left science 
with a subject ivist, even solipsist foundation, and the logical positivists spent much 
energy trying to remedy this state of affairs. It is worthwhile pointing this out, since 
positivism is often associated with numbers, quantities and statistics. Underlying, we 
find people’s private sense experiences – and they are surely qualitative in nature.
Not only the logical positivists but all empiricists in general share the view of sci-
ence that experience is needed to test, confirm or falsify theories. Therefore, they 
make a clear distinction between the empirical and the non-empirical, between the 
observational and the theoretical: the empirical has the power to confirm or discon-
firm the theoretical, but not vice versa. The empirical, in other words, enjoys a higher 
epistemic status. We also find here a basic tenet concerning terms. Observable enti-
ties, attributes or processes are referred to by observational terms, O-terms, such as 
blue, lamp, or warmer than (which is a directly observable relation). Unobservables 
are referred to by T-terms, which must satisfy the empiricist criterion of meaning to 
be allowed in scientific theorizing.
While antirealists oppose the idea of moving beyond experience, realists stand 
ready to make a metaphysical commitment to the existence of the unobservables 
referred to by T-terms, insofar as they are described by correct theories (Hacking, 
1983). Intelligence, motivation and abilities exist and can safely be attributed to peo-
ple and used to explain their behavior. It seems to us that scientific realism is a natural 
pre-philosophical stance, adopted by most empirical researchers – perhaps because 
it is a continuation of the commonsensical ways of thinking that we are all socialized 
into when we grow up. If you are a realist, you interpret theories and claims literally, 
as telling us something about unobservables and their equally unobservable qualities. 
You do not think that the meaning of all claims must be tied to observation, like the 
antirealists do – especially if they adhere to the verification principle described above. 
Realism is surely attractive to researchers, because it allows them to think that 
reference takes place. We are allowed to think that the unobservables exist, and that 
it is possible to say something about them. We can actually say something about the 
role of motivation in learning and refer to unobservable entities to explain observable 
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ones. Moreover, realists think that what we say of the world can be true or false. We 
shall discuss the ontology of theoretical entities in the subsequent section, but first, 
a few more words about realism. Despite its attraction, realism faces vast philosoph-
ical challenges, and much criticism has been levelled against it. Bas van Fraassen 
(e.g. 1989) is one of the most prominent and well-known antirealists; by his own 
description a constructive empiricist and not a logical positivist. One of his reasons 
for rejecting realism is that he thinks it leads to an inflationary metaphysics – realists 
commit themselves to the existence of theoretical entities described by scientific the-
ories. Being agnostic about the existence of theoretical entities is a much better bet, 
van Fraassen claims. This sounds like good advice; we should not willy-nilly commit 
ourselves to the existence of any theoretical entity, regardless of our judgment of the 
quality of the theory – better to leave it open. Furthermore, the history of science 
bears out van Fraassen’s point here. One of the best-known examples is phlogiston 
theory, which in its day was thought to be a highly successful theory in terms of power 
of explanation and prediction, but eventually turned out to be false. Phlogiston does 
not exist after all, and so reference fails – and it was clearly a mistake to commit to 
it. The pessimistic meta-induction is a similar argument, but it makes a stronger 
claim. This viewpoint is perhaps most forcefully advocated by Larry Laudan (1981). 
Laudan presents a long list of once successful theories and terms which modern 
science has found to refer to nothing at all. The history of science thus far gives rise 
to the inductive inference that even our best theories today will be shown to be false 
and be replaced by other theories. Therefore, we have no good reason to think that 
unobservable entities postulated by our current best theories refer to anything at all. 
The nature of constructs
Let us now go back and take a closer look at T-terms. One might wonder what anti-
realists need T-terms or constructs for, if they think they have no reference or remain 
agnostic about it. What is the use of T-terms, if they do not refer to anything? Here is 
how personality researcher Walter Mischel describes the T-term “trait” – we can sub-
stitute a wide variety of educational terms for “trait” (e.g. understanding, diligence 
or Bildung): 
Traits are constructs that are inferred or abstracted from behavior. When the 
relations between the observed behavior and the attributed trait are relatively direct, 
the trait serves essentially as a summary term for the behaviors that have been 
integrated by the observer … regardless of the exact genesis of trait impressions, 
trait labels may serve as summaries (essentially arithmetic averages) for observed 
behavior. (1973, p. 262)
This is the empiricist criterion of meaning at work: T-terms have no meaning unless 
they are connected to experience. For empiricists of all stripes, O-terms are basic 
and all other terms must be built on them. Hence, as Stephen Norris (1983) points 
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out, traits are not attributes possessed by people. Rather, the construct is equated 
with a class of behavior, and thus reflects the observer’s thoughts instead of the 
actors’, Norris suggests. T-terms are nothing but abbreviations of a large class of 
observations, a form of derived talk. As Norris puts it, “According to logical positiv-
ism, theoretical talk in effect is merely a shorthand way of speaking and has no other 
significant import” (p. 56). This treatment of T-terms presupposes that T-language 
can be translated into O-language. From the point of view of empirical research, 
Jack Shonkoff and Deborah Phillips (2000, pp. 82–83) describe the problem(s) as 
follows:
In measuring height (or weight or lung capacity, for example), there is little 
disagreement about the meaning of the construct being measured, or about the units 
of measurement (e.g., centimeters, grams, cubic centimeters) … Measuring growth 
in psychological domains (e.g. vocabulary, quantitative reasoning, verbal memory, 
hand-eye coordination, self-regulation) is more problematic. Disagreement is more 
likely to arise about the definition of the construct to be assessed. This occurs, 
in part, because there are often no natural units of measurement. (i.e., nothing 
comparable to the use of inches when measuring heights)
Disagreement on how to measure constructs is to be expected, they suggest, and it is 
easy to agree with them on that. But what interests us here is the issue of definition. 
We have here the problem of operational definitions, which precisely concerns the 
translation of T into O: some behavioral indicators are picked out from a universe 
of behaviors to represent the construct under investigation. This fits well with the 
empiricist criterion of meaning, and is in general the way in which empiricists define 
terms: by equating them with the procedures for measuring them. But this is not how 
realists define concepts. For realists, the meaning of the concept (term, construct) is 
not equal to the procedures for measuring it, but is taken to be the sense or content 
of the term, which for example might be determined by the place and role of the term 
in a theory or a domain.
It is worthwhile to ponder the translatability of the theoretical into the observa-
tional, the psychological into the physical or the phenomenological, or the educa-
tional into classes of behavior. But how should we understand it, Jaegwon Kim asks 
in his incisive analysis of a certain part of the history of positivism (Kim, 2003). 
The positivists themselves never quite figured it out – we are not just talking about 
semantic equivalences here. The strong version of the verification principle demands 
the complete translation of  T into O (a perfect operational definition, T = O), some-
thing which, if it were possible, would render the T-term a complete summary of the 
observations. And, we might note, there would be no construct validity problem, 
since there would be perfect identity between the T-term and our observational basis. 
It is also noteworthy that the problem of translatability faces anybody who attempts 
to make theoretical terms accessible for observation, whether realistically or antire-
alistically inclined.
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Realists, as we have seen, are allowed to think that T-terms have references. They 
can for example think that abilities are properties of people, not classes of their 
behavior, or that inner processes such as self-formation actually take place. As we 
also have seen, they face the problem of justifying that unobservable entities are 
real, since obviously no observational test can decide this question. Instead, real-
ists hold the view that theoretical entities refer to unobservable entities which have 
(or can have) observable manifestations. But, as argued in the previous section, 
we should not be gullible and accept the existence of just any entity described by 
a T-term. We know even from daily life that many of our terms have no reference; 
such as “troll” and “unicorn”, or idealizations such as “average person” and “ratio-
nal man”. 
Truth 
What are the consequences of these differing views on the ontology of T-terms? It 
is time to widen the scope to include theories or claims, and our philosophical tour 
moves on to the issue of truth. 
The question here is how we understand the nature of theories or claims more gen-
erally: are they assertoric claims that purport to tell us what phenomena in the world, 
especially those involving unobservable entities, are like; or are they tools for organiz-
ing experience or making predictions? Assertoric claims are capable of being true or 
false; for example, the claim that feedback on assignments increases student motiva-
tion for academic work or that high motivation makes students more diligent. Real-
ists interpret T-terms literally, and they also interpret theories literally – as asserting 
something about the world and therefore capable of being true or false; truth being 
understood as correspondence between language and the world. The correspondence 
theory of truth comes in slightly different versions, but basically it says that a theory 
is true if the state of affairs it claims to be the case actually is the case; i.e. there are 
so-called truth makers in the world that determine the truth value of the theory (e.g. 
Kirkham, 1997). Theories can be true, approximately true or downright false. This 
does not work unless the terms of the theories, O-terms and T-terms alike, refer to 
things, properties, attributes or processes in the world. And since realists interpret 
terms literally, they do so refer, and the theory is capable of truth or falsity. Since we 
do know at least some of the truths about some phenomenon, for instance the effects 
of feedback on motivation, we can infer that the T-terms involved successfully refer to 
entities or attributes in the world.
The antirealist story is different. Leaving observables aside: if the existence of the-
oretical entities is denied, there is nothing for a theory to be true about, in the corre-
spondence sense of truth. A T-term is derived talk, abstracted from observations, and 
nothing more than an abbreviation. Theories that employ such terms do not purport 
to tell us what the world is like, insofar as unobservables are involved – observable 
phenomena can of course be correctly or incorrectly described. If theories are not 
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used to provide accounts of phenomena, how then are they used? Like T-terms are 
shorthand tools to make scientific communication more expedient, theories are also 
tools and serve to organize our experience and our data in packages that we find 
convenient. Tools are not true or false, and antirealists therefore reject the correspon-
dence theory of truth. Instead, they make use of the coherence theory of truth or the 
instrumental (pragmatic) theory of truth. The coherence theory basically defines a 
claim to be true if it coheres within a system of other statements, and the instrumen-
tal theory basically says that a claim is true if it is useful. As Norris (1983) points out, 
the logical positivists frequently combined the two, in that coherent systems can be 
used for making predictions and are therefore useful guides to action. Tools are not 
true or false; they are more or less effective, more or less adequate and fit for their 
purpose. We should note, however, that a theory can be true, coherent and useful at 
the same time – these are not exclusive categories. 
So what should we do at this point? We can decide to be agnostic about whether 
theories are true, false, approximately true, adequate or downright fictitious, as long 
as they enable us to predict, which on an antirealist view is the most important task 
of science. Theories are confirmed if predictions are realized and disconfirmed if they 
are not; in accordance with the epistemic status given to experience. But can we, in 
the long run, be neutral as to treating theories as truths about the world versus treat-
ing them as instruments? 
Can we avoid taking position on the truth of a theory and deciding whether to 
believe it or not? We think researchers have a choice to make here, on what they think 
the basic job of science is. 
Causation and explanation 
Explanations are generally thought to be (possible) answers to why-questions, 
although the history of science shows much disagreement over what sort of answers 
should count as genuine explanations – teleological, functional, theological, astrolog-
ical, causal or intentional. Whatever we think counts as legitimate explanations, they 
often contain unobserved processes or mechanisms. This is equally true of all scien-
tific disciplines. We explain observable phenomena by making claims about invisible 
entities, events, properties, processes or states. This kind of explanation is for realists. 
So, if you think you can explain bad study habits by referring to low motivation, 
you show yourself to be a realist. If motivation does not exist and thus cannot be 
endowed with certain powers to make it responsible for the observed result, then it 
obviously cannot be used to explain the result in question, for example study habits. 
The explanatory power of theories resides in the fact that their theoretical terms refer 
to some unobservable mechanism or process, realists claim, and this stands to rea-
son. If T-terms are abbreviations of O-terms, the theories containing them could not 
explain observational claims – they could only summarize them, provide shorthand, 
expedient ways of talking about them. 
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Realists tend to place great emphasis on the power of theories not only to describe 
phenomena, but also to explain them. Many take explanation to be the main aim of 
science (Ladyman, 2002; Norris, 1983). And (approximate) truth, understood as 
correspondence, is regarded as necessary for a theory to be explanatory. But here 
the realists might be over-selling their case. As Bas van Fraassen (1989) points out, 
false theories can actually provide good explanations. For example, Newton’s theory 
is known to be false (on the correspondence theory of truth), but it nevertheless pro-
vides a good explanation of the tides, as well as other earthly phenomena. It is not 
that easy to think of an educational example of this; it could be that we in education 
are more geared to other uses of theory. Explanatory power, van Fraassen argues, is a 
pragmatic virtue of theories that comes into play in certain contexts, when and if the 
researcher takes an interest in it. Antirealists tend to place more emphasis on predic-
tion. Roughly, theories are tested by deriving hypotheses about observable events and 
then seeing whether the predictions hold – as argued above, on the antirealist view 
theories are confirmed if the predictions are realized. 
We treat causation here for two main reasons. First, because most explanations 
would seem to be causal, such that causation is involved in the explanation of an event. 
Second, because while causation is highly contested in education, it is also needed 
in a discipline which takes change as one of its aims, usually in the form of learning. 
Causation is a dynamic process that involves the generation of some effect, preferably 
a desired one. “Cause” is a T-term. And again, only realistically interpreted theoret-
ical entities will be able to play the role of a cause and exert an influence, increase 
student motivation, reduce negativity in interactional patterns, and the like. If your 
theoretical entity is a summary, a categorization of observations, it does not possess 
the power to influence other entities and contribute to change. So, here is another 
choice for researchers to make: whether to think of theoretical entities as possible 
causes and thus endow them with certain dynamic generative powers; or whether to 
treat of causation in the usual antirealist manner, which harks back to David Hume 
and sees causation as constant conjunction. Constant conjunctions are events that 
occur simultaneously and the causal connection between them is attributed by the 
observer. In fact, such relationships are best described as absolute correlations, and 
without a causal relationship between the respective events you cannot use the one 
to influence the other. 
Construct validity: a philosophical bastard?
It is time to end our short tour, and we do so by returning to our point of departure: 
construct validity, this time armed with a set of central philosophical concepts and 
perspectives. 
Construct validity concerns the legitimacy of the inferences we make about unob-
servable entities, processes, qualities or states. As we have seen, it is guided by two 
different perspectives that do not sit well together, and several writers point out the 
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inconsistencies in the overall theoretical framework (e.g. Borsboom, Mellenbergh & 
van Heerden, 2004; Michell, 1997; Norris, 1983). The best place to see these inconsist-
encies is arguably in the works of the classics in the field, for example Lee Cronbach 
and Paul Meehl. In their 1955 paper, which sets the stage for much of the subsequent 
discussion about construct validity, they avoid speaking of anything having to do with 
causation, and there is no discussion of theoretical entities having to exist. Instead, 
they employ a hypothetico-deductive view of construct validity, a way of thinking 
which belongs with the antirealist view of testing, confirmation and disconfirmation. 
This was picked up by Messick (1975), who argued that the major requirement of 
construct validity is confirmed predictions about how a test’s performances should 
relate to other performances. However, in 1971 Cronbach argues that descriptions 
that referring to people’s internal processes require construct validation – something 
which implies a realist understanding of constructs. His view, that people’s perfor-
mance can be explained by the process or state which produces the performance, is 
also clearly realist (Cronbach, 1971, p. 465). On the other hand, he does not commit 
to the correspondence theory of truth, but explicitly refers to usefulness (p. 477). He 
argues that construct validation is not about showing constructs to be actual existing 
things, but showing that they are consistent with the evidence – an antirealist inclina-
tion (pp. 482–483). In 1977, Meehl also took a realist turn and argued that research 
should move beyond co-variations to look for causal relationships and mechanisms 
that can explain the observed correlations (Meehl, 1977, p. 37). 
A final point to be noted in this section: the very definition of construct validation 
itself. Roughly speaking, the meaning of a term is its sense; the ideas and descrip-
tions associated with the term. Simple O-terms can be defined by pointing to their 
references, such as “mug” or “book”. But since the references of T-terms are invisible, 
unobservable or undetectable, they cannot be defined in the same way as O-terms. 
There are different accounts of how T-terms acquire their meaning and how the 
meaning changes over time (which it undoubtedly does), but these need not concern 
us here. What now about construct validity? We hint in the introduction that we take 
the meaning of construct validation to center on the justification of our inferences 
about unobservable entities, processes or attributes – thus revealing, we presume, 
realist leanings. Those with antirealist leanings would instead employ the verification 
criterion of meaning and define construct validation in terms of the procedures or 
techniques for conducting it. Thus, Messick in 1981 defined construct validation as 
implying a joint convergent and discriminant strategy (p. 575), which echoes Cook 
and Campbell’s view from 1979 that evaluating construct validity proceeds on testing 
for convergence and for divergence (p. 61). It will be recalled that Messick in 1995 
defined validity as “an overall evaluative judgment of the degree to which empiri-
cal evidence and theoretical rationales support the adequacy and appropriateness of 
interpretations and actions based on test scores or other modes of assessment” (p. 5, 
italics in original). This definition betrays realist inclinations in that the meaning of 
construct validation clearly is no longer couched in terms of procedures for handling 
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it – the use of support indicates that what he is after, is the justification (adequacy 
and appropriateness) of our interpretations (inferences). His subsequent treatment 
of the different aspects of validity is highly sophisticated and shows the complexities 
of our inferential practices, especially those that concern measurement, testing and 
assessment. One of these aspects he terms “consequential”. This aspect concerns 
an appraisal of actual and potential consequences of test use, especially in regard 
to sources of invalidity (such as e.g. bias). This clearly points toward realist inclina-
tions – if you think a construct is a summary of observations, you surely would not 
worry about sources of invalidity.
Thus, we can see that realism and antirealism follow construct validation even into 
the concept itself.
Conclusion
This philosophical tour started in construct validity and ends in construct validity, 
via visits to such central topics as reference, truth, explanation and causation as these 
are encapsulated by two major perspectives: realism and antirealism. We have kept 
the tour short for reasons of clarity, in order to highlight main differences and show 
what is at stake. Hence, we have elected to overlook many details and nuances and 
possible cross-combinations. 
We hope a clear picture has emerged of why construct validity is important in edu-
cational research – and not only in research, but in practice and in all everyday infer-
ences where we make use of theoretical entities to make attributions, assessments, 
evaluations and explanations. Our assessments of people may matter greatly to them, 
and we should do our best to safeguard and justify our inferences. Interestingly, the 
field of construct validity is guided by both realism and antirealism. These are -isms 
and thus not to be understood as empirical theses, but rather as overreaching, com-
prehensive attitudes toward research in general, theoretical entities, the question of 
truth, the nature of claims and even definitional issues. They can hardly claim to be 
true or false in themselves, at least not according to the correspondence theory of 
truth. Any researcher is free to choose between them, but has to be aware that the 
choice has consequences. 
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